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The prominence of judicial review in the history of constitu-
tional interpretation in this republic often overshadows the es-
sential and ongoing role of other institutions in the interpretation 
of the Constitution of the United States. The finality of Supreme 
Court decisions (barring reversal by the Court or by amendment) 
plays a major-and appropriate-role in focusing our attention 
on the courts' decisions, but other factors also shape our percep-
tions. It is, at least superficially, I easy to trace the course of Con-
stitutional interpretation in the reported cases, and there is an 
abundance of secondary literature. The history of congressional 
and presidential interpretation, in contrast, is much less well-
known.z It is, furthermore, intrinsically more difficult to grasp. 
Non-judicial interpretations of the Constitution are often implicit 
rather than overt, embedded in political decisions that may in-
clude no express discussion of constitutional issues at all. The 
collective nature of congressional action and the often-confiden-
tial character of executive branch deliberations add to the diffi-
culties of working out the history of non-judicial interpretation.3 
* The opinions expressed in this essay are ours-or Attorney General 
Bradford's-and not necessarily those of the Department of Justice. We would like to 
thank Kelly Conner for her assistance. 
** Acting Solicitor General, United States Department of Justice; Professor of Law 
(on leave), Duke University. 
•** Principal Deputy Solicitor General, United States Department of Justice; Pro-
fessor of Law (on leave), Duke University. 
1. Even with respect to the courts, the easily accesible case reports are a partial and 
potentially misleading basis on which to rest historical scholarship. Professor William 
Casto's important new book on the Supreme Court's first decade reveals an active and 
important institution that a lawyer confined to the pages of the United States Reports 
would be unable to perceive. See William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in che Early 
Republic (U. of South Carolina Press, !995). 
2. The important history of constitutional interpretation by other institutions and 
actors-lower executive branch officials, states, juries, non-governmental organizations, 
and so on-is still more obscure. 
3. The recent work of Professor David Currie on constitutional interpretation in 
the First Congress is an important example of how much can be learned from a close 
examination of congressional debate and action. See David P. Currie, The Conscicucion in 
Congress: The Firs£ Congress and the Struccure of Government, 1789-179/, 2 U. Chi. L. 
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At times, however, the problem is even more basic: the orig-
inal materials necessary for understanding the development of 
executive or congressional interpretation may simply be gener-
ally unavailable. A significant number of early opinions of the 
Attorneys General, for example, never were collected in the offi-
cial Opinions of the Attorneys General, the first volume of which 
was published in 1852,4 and remain in manuscript or printed only 
in out of print and inaccurate nineteenth-century books on other 
subjects. This is true of what was, to our knowledge, the most 
important opinion written by an Attorney General during the 
1790s on an issue of separation of powers. What follows, after a 
brief introduction to the context of that opinion, is a modern edi-
tion of that opinion, written by Attorney General William Brad-
ford in 1794.s 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From the beginning of the Union, one of the most important 
modes of interaction between the President and Congress has 
been the executive's submission of information for legislative 
consideration. Article II of the Constitution requires that the 
President "from time to time give to the Congress Information of 
the State of the Union,"6 and the early Presidents evidently did 
not regard that duty as satisfied by the ritual performance of an 
annual address.? However, "Congress began almost immediately 
to call for information not voluntarily submitted,"s and in short 
order the question arose of whether the President has some de-
gree of discretion in responding to such requests. The general 
propriety of legislative requests for information and documents 
was never in doubt: in April 1792, George Washington's cabinet 
Sch. Roundtable 161 (1995); David P. Currie, The Conscitucion in Congress: Subscancive 
Issues in the First Congress 1789-1791, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 775 (1994). On the other hand, 
the self-evidently labor-intensive nature of Currie's scholarship may well be a deterrent to 
others! 
4. Volume 1 of the official Opinions of the Attorneys General collects opinions 
from the first Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, on, but has significant gaps in its 
coverage. 
5. The only previous publication of Bradford's opinion was a defective edition in 
John C. Hamilton, ed., 4 Works of Alexander Hamilton 494-95 (J.F. Trow, 1851 ). 
6. Art. II, sec. 3, cl. 1. 
7. See, e.g., Abraham D. Sofaer, War, Foreign Affairs and Constitutional Power 77-
78 (Ballinger Publishing Company, 1976) (discussing President Washington's practice of 
sending "material to keep Congress informed of important developments, including mat-
ters that could have led to military actions"); id. at 176-77 (noting that President Jeffer-
son's practice was similar to that of his predecessors). Our outline of the context of 
Attorney General Bradford's opinion is dependent on the discussion in Sofaer's invalua-
ble book. 
8. ld. at 78. 
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unanimously advised him that the House of Representatives was 
entitled to request the transmission of documents in the execu-
tive's possession in order to carry out its functions.9 At the same 
time, however, the cabinet was agreed that the President had the 
duty and the authority not to transmit any documents, "the dis-
closure of which would injure the public" in his opinion.l 0 
It is unclear whether, and to what extent, the cabinet's con-
clusion that the President could refuse to disclose information in 
order to protect the public interest was communicated to the 
House. Although Washington and his advisors did not think that 
the public interest required withholding any of the requested 
documents, no response was made until the House limited the 
request to documents "of a public nature," at which point the 
President complied.11 Two years later, however, Washington ex-
pressly exercised the authority to limit the disclosure of informa-
tion to a house of Congress in the public interest. 
On January 24, 1794, the Senate passed a resolution request-
ing the President "to lay before the Senate the correspondences 
which have been had between the Minister of the United States 
at the Republic of France and said Republic, and between said 
Minister and the office of Secretary of State."Iz The minister in 
question was the flamboyant Gouverneur Morris, whose patent 
dislike of the Revolutionary regime in France had enraged that 
government as well as its American sympathizers; some of the 
9. The request arose out of congressional concern over the Wabash Nation's stun-
ning defeat of the Army in November 1791 and initially was made by a special investiga-
tory committee of the House and addressed to Secretary of War Henry Knox. Although 
the cabinet members advised Washington that such requests properly should be ad-
dressed to the President rather than to a subordinate officer, they did not draw any dis-
tinction between the committee and the House as a whole. As Secretary of State Thomas 
Jefferson wrote: 
We had all considered, and were of one mind, first. that the House was an in-
quest, and therefore might institute inquiries. Second. that it might call for pa-
pers generally. Third, that the Executive ought to communicate such papers as 
the public good would permit, and ought to refuse those, the disclosure of which 
would injure the public: consequently were to exercise a discretion. 
Jefferson, The Anas, in Andrew A. Lipscomb, ed., I The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 
303-04 (Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903). 
10. !d. at 304. 
II. In addition to being a resolution of the House itself rather than the committee. 
the second request for documents was addressed to the President rather than to Secretary 
Knox. Sofaer concludes from this fact and the insertion of the "public nature" limitation 
that the substance of the cabinet's advice to Washington had been communicated to the 
House. Sofaer, Constitutional Power at 82 (cited in note 7). However, he notes an ambi-
guity in the limiting language, which could be read either to recognize a public-interest 
qualification along the lines of the cabinet opinion or simply to exclude the papers of 
private persons from the request. I d. at 82-83 (concluding that the House probably in-
tended the public-interest construction of its language). 
12. ld. at 83. 
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resolution's supporters no doubt saw the request as a means of 
embarrassing the Federalist administration in the person of one 
of its most partisan officers. After reviewing his files, Secretary 
of State Edmund Randolph informed Washington that Morris's 
correspondence did contain passages that it would be impolitic to 
disclose for various reasons.13 
As in 1792, Washington asked the advice of his cabinet on 
the proper response to the Senate resolution. At a meeting of 
the three secretaries on January 28, they agreed to advise the 
President that he was not obligated to comply with the letter of 
the resolution, although they disagreed over the extent of the dis-
cretion he could or should exercise in withholding material.14 
Secretary of War Henry Knox and Secretary of the Treasury Al-
exander Hamilton opined that the President should transmit "no 
part of the correspondences," although Hamilton conceded that 
"the principle [presumably, of discretion to withhold diplomatic 
correspondence] is safe, by excepting such parts as the President 
may choose to withold."1s Secretary Randolph believed that the 
President should deliver "all the correspondence, proper from its 
nature to be communicated to the Senate ... , but that what the 
President thinks improper, should not be sent."16 The differ-
ences within the cabinet that the opinion reveals are interesting, 
although their importance should not be exaggerated: it was 
common ground that the President was not bound by the fact 
that the Senate had expressed no public-interest (or indeed, any 
other) limitation on the documents it requested and that the de-
cision of how to comply with the resolution, if at all, was the 
President's. The high officers of the Washington administration 
remained committed to the position that, at least with respect to 
requests by a single house, the President enjoys significant discre-
tion to control the disclosure of information. 
13. While Randolph thought that Morris's letters included "little of what is excep-
tionable, .. he did recommend that Washington withhold certain passages: 
(1) what related to Mr. G[ene]t [the controversial French minister to the United 
States]; (2) some harsh expressions of the conduct of the rulers of France, which 
if returned to that country, might expose him [Morris] to danger; (3) the authors 
of some interesting information, who, if known would be infallibly denounced. 
Randolph to Washington (Jan. 26, 1794), in Sofaer, Constitutional Power at 83 n. * (cited in 
note 7). 
14. The cabinet members jointly signed an opinion that expressed each individual 
member's view. See Opinion on Communicating to the Senate the Dispatches of 
Gouverneur Morris (Jan. 28, 1794), in Harold C. Syrett, ed., 15 Papers of Alexander Ham-
ilton 666-67 (Columbia U. Press, 1%9). 
15. !d. at 667. 
16. ld. 
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President Washington's practice of obtaining formal, written 
opinions from the heads of departments on difficult questions of 
law and policy did not prevent him from seeking the legal views 
of his Attorney General as well.J7 At the time the Senate passed 
the Morris resolution, there was, in fact, no Attorney General, 
but the day before the cabinet met and formulated its opinion, 
President Washington appointed William Bradford to the vacant 
office.Js Bradford had served in the Continental Army, and was 
then appointed attorney general of Pennsylvania in 1780. De-
spite his youth and inexperience,J9 Bradford served with distinc-
tion for more than a decade and was elevated to the state 
supreme court in 1791. His greatest accomplishment was his suc-
cessful attempt to curtail the use of capital punishment: he is 
credited with wielding decisive influence on the Pennsylvania 
legislature's decision in 1794 to eliminate the death penalty for 
all crimes except first degree murder. 
The proper response to the Senate resolution calling for the 
Morris correspondence was the first question Washington put to 
17. It should be noted that Washington played a crucial role in shaping the concept 
of the heads of the departments as a presidential "cabinet.'' The original constitutional 
text nowhere refers to the heads of the executive departments as a cabinet, although it 
empowers the President to require from any of them "the Opinion, in writing ... upon 
any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices." U.S. Con st., Art. II, sec. 2, 
cl. 1. However. Washington's own wartime experiences (and British example) led him to 
treat the three original secretaries as, individually and collectively, a council of advisors 
on whatever matters he deemed appropriate. See Glenn A. Phelps, George Washington 
and American Constitutionalism 162-63 (U. Press of Kansas, 1993). The Attorney Gen-
eral, not being the head of a department before 1870, was not subject to Article ll's 
Opinion Clause, but the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that established the office 
required the Attorney General to advise the President on legal matters. See Act of Sept. 
24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93. Washington's Attorneys General often participated in cabinet 
deliberations. See. e.g., Jefferson, Anas at 303 (cited in note 9). 
18. The first Attorney General (Randolph) had become Secretary of State at the 
beginning of January. It is surprisingly difficult to determine on precisely which day 
Bradford assumed the office of Attorney General: many sources state that he was ap-
pointed on January 28, although President Washington's journal of his official acts records 
that he "(s)igned a Commission for William Bradford. being appointed Attorney General 
for the US." on Jan. 27, 1794. Dorothy Twohig, ed., Papers of George Washington: The 
Journal of the Proceedings of the President 1793-1797 at 280 (U. Press of Virginia, 1981). 
19. Bradford was born in 1755 and graduated from Princeton in 1772. His legal 
studies were interrupted by the outbreak of the war. in the course of which he rose from 
private to colonel before health problems compelled him to resign from the Continental 
Army in 1779. After a brief additional period of legal study, Bradford was admitted to 
the bar the same year. He thus was 25 and a member of the bar for only a year when he 
became state attorney general. Bradford's early advancement may not have been entirely 
a recognition of his personal abilities: his father, the printer William Bradford. was a great 
figure in the Patriot movement of the 1770s. For this information. we have relied on the 
brief essays on Bradford in Arthur Robb, Biographical Sketches of the Attorneys General: 
Edmund Randolph to Tom C. Clark (2d ed. 1946), and in Allen Johnson. ed .. Dictionary 
of American Biography 566 (Charles Scribner's Sons. 1964). 
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Attorney General Bradford. His opinion is undated, but the ref-
erence in the opinion to the resolution shows that he wrote it 
before the end of January. Bradford came to the same practical 
judgment that the cabinet members had reached: the President 
had the authority to transmit to the Senate only those parts of 
the Morris correspondence that he deemed proper to disclose. 
Unlike the conclusory advice of the three secretaries, however, 
his opinion is a succinct, and even elegant, statement of his rea-
soning. Bradford grounded the President's authority over the 
disclosure of diplomatic information-he termed it a "duty"-on 
both constitutional principle and the nature of diplomacy.zo 
"[T]he rights of the executive and the nature of foreign corre-
spondences require" that documents that "in the judgment of the 
Executive shall be deemed unsafe and improper to be disclosed" 
should be withheld.zJ 
At the same time that Bradford apparently asserted presi-
dential authority to disregard the terms of the Senate resolution, 
he argued that the President appropriately might interpret the 
resolution as not requiring of him action contrary to "the rights 
of the Executive."zz The Senate's resolution, Bradford rea-
soned, ought to be construed on the presumption that the Senate 
had acted with respect both for the necessity of confidentiality 
and for the President's responsibilities. "[I]t could scarcely be 
supposed even if the words were stronger that the Senate in-
tended to include any Letters the disclosure of which might en-
danger national honour or individual safety."z3 The fact that the 
letter of the resolution seemed to call for the Morris correspon-
dence in its entirety, therefore, did not "exclude, in the construc-
tion of it" the exercise of executive discretion to withhold 
material that "any circumstances may render improper to be 
communicated. "24 
President Washington ultimately acted in accordance with 
the advice of his cabinet and of Attorney General Bradford and 
on February 26, 1794, transmitted to the Senate a redacted set of 
the requested documents. As the President's cover letter to the 
Senate explained: "After an examination of [the Morris corre-
spondence], I directed copies and translations to be made; except 
in those particulars which, in my judgment, for public considera-
20. Attorney General Bradford's Opinion, Washington Papers (on file with the Li-
brary of Congress). 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. ld. 
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tions, ought not to be communicated."zs The Senate did not pro-
test Washington's mode of compliance with its request, and, 
indeed, Secretary of State Randolph informed the President that 
his action "appears to have given general satisfaction," and, in 
particular, that Congressman James Madison had agreed in con-
versation that "the discretion of the President was always to be 
the guide" in such matters.26 
The 1794 Senate resolution was not President Washington's 
last encounter with the relationship between the President's con-
trol over sensitive information and congressional document re-
quests, although Bradford's death the following year prevented 
him from further involvement in the issue.n The most famous 
incident involved the demand by the House of Representatives 
in March 1796 for all documents relating to the negotiation of the 
controversial Jay Treaty with Great Britain.zs On that occasion, 
Washington flatly refused to comply with the House's resolution, 
in part because he viewed the resolution as an unconstitutional 
intrusion into the treaty power shared by the President and the 
Senate.29 However, Washington also invoked the argument from 
the nature and necessities of diplomacy that his second Attorney 
General had presented two years before. 
25. Sofaer, Consrirutional Power at 84 (cited in note 7). 
26. See id. at 85 n.*. 
27. Bradford died on August 23. 1795. Johnson, ed., Dictionary of American Biogra-
phy at 566 (cited in note 19). 
28. For a collection of the most important documents, with commentary, see H. Jef-
ferson Powell, Languages of Power 104-13 (Carolina Academic Press, 1991). 
29. In his recent book on Washington's constitutional thought and practice, Glenn 
~helps states_that Washington's 1796 refusal "was based not on a general claim of execu-
tive prerogative, but rather on a constitutional interpretation that narrowed the House's 
role in foreign affairs." Phelps. George Washingwn at 177 (cited in note 17). Although 
we admire Phelps's important work. this assertion seems to overstate the extent to which 
Washington presented only one argument for his position. In any event, Phelps does not 
questiOn Washington's acceptance in principle of the sort of arguments Bradford made in 
1794. See id. at 172-78. 
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II. ATIORNEY GENERAL BRADFORD'S OPINIQN3o 
The Attorney General has the honour to report, 
That having considered the Resolve of the Senate of the 
24th instant whereby the President of the United States 
is requested to lay before that body the correspondence 
which has been had between the minister of the FI-ench 
R United States at the French Republic and the said 
Republic and between said Minister and the office 
of Secretary of State ---
He is of opinion that it is the duty of the Execu-
tive to withhold such parts of the said correspondence 
as in the judgment of the Executive shall be deemed 
unsafe and improper to be disclosed. He also con-
ceives that the general terms of the resolve do 
not exclude, in the construction of it, those just 
exceptions which the rights of the executive and 
the nature of foreign correspondences require. Every 
call of this nature, where the correspondence is 
secret and no specific object pointed at, must 
be presumed to proceed upon the idea that the 
papers requested are proper to be communicated[;] 
& it could scarcely be supposed, even if the words 
were stronger[,] that the Senate intended to include 
any Letters[,] the disclosure of which might endan-
ger national honour or individual safety. 
The Attorney General is therefore of opinion, 
That it will be advisable for the President to com-
municate to the Senate such parts of the said 
Correspondence as upon examination he shall deem 
safe & proper to dislose: withholding all such, as 
any circumstances may render improper to be 
communicated. 
Wm Bradford 
The President of the United States 
30. The following transcription reproduces Randolph's handwritten text, which is 
preserved in the Washington Papers in the Library of Congress. The layout attempts to 
replicate the appearance of the originals. 
